A platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic (...) luck. This paper argues, first, that the dominant view of epistemic luck in the literature, the modal view, does not yield a satisfactory account of lucky collective beliefs. Second, it argues that collective epistemic luck is better explained in terms of groups lacking forms of control over collective belief formation that are specific to the different procedures for forming collective beliefs. One of the main implications of this, we will argue, is that groups whose beliefs are formed via internal deliberation are more vulnerable to knowledge-undermining collective luck than groups that form their beliefs via non-deliberative methods, such as non-deliberative anonymous voting. The bottom line is that the greater exposure to knowledge-undermining luck that deliberation gives rise to provides a reason for thinking that non-deliberative methods of group belief formation have greater epistemic value. (shrink)

Our current society seems to require a sharp separation between what can be tolerated in public and what must remain hidden. There is explicit and implicit censorship of both the subject of death and of the crying and suffering of surviving relatives and friends. Medieval literature and literary studies, however, show how the experience of dying and its appropriate manifestations of grief seemed to be more integrated into everyday life, as opposed to the apparent “disintegration” of nowadays. It is possible (...) to begin to detect this evolution already in medieval Hispanic literature itself, from an apparently more public, visible and integrated death in 13th-century Hispanic literature to a more private, concealed and disintegrated death in 15th-century Hispanic literature. This process will continue its journey to the present society of eternal springs and summers from which we have eradicated autumns and winters, seasons as necessary for the cycle of life – for personal, psychological and social balance – as the first two. Keywords: death; mourning; crying; medieval literature. Resumen Nuestra sociedad actual parece presentar una tajante separación entre lo que puede ser tolerado en público y lo que debe permanecer oculto. Hay una censura explícita e implícita tanto del tema de la muerte como del llanto y el sufrimiento de los familiares y amigos supervivientes. Sin embargo, la literatura medieval y los estudios literarios sobre la misma muestran cómo la experiencia del morir y sus apropiadas manifestaciones de dolor parecían estar más integradas en la vida cotidiana en contraposición a la aparente “desintegración” actual. Es posible comenzar a detectar esta evolución ya en la propia literatura hispánica medieval, desde una muerte aparentemente más pública, visible e integrada en la literatura hispánica del siglo XIII hasta una muerte más privada, oculta y desintegrada en la literatura hispánica del siglo XV. Este proceso continuará su recorrido hasta una sociedad actual de eternas primaveras y veranos de la que hemos erradicado los otoños e inviernos, estaciones tan necesarias para el ciclo de la vida —para el equilibrio personal, psicológico y social— como las dos primeras. Palabras clave: muerte; duelo; llanto; literatura medieval. (shrink)

We defend the moral and legal right to secede in accordance with plebiscitary theory. Our paper has three main goals. First, by offering a schematic characterization of plebiscitary theory, the main arguments in its favour (and the main objections to them), we contribute to clarify the structure of this complex debate. Second, we stress the point that, if the moral right to secede is established, the resistance for its inclusion into positive law is unjustified. Finally, by addressing old and new (...) objections to plebiscitary theory, we hope to make a compelling case for a wider recognition of secessionist rights. (shrink)

O seguinte artigo tem como objetivo apresentar a interpretação realizada pelo filósofo e místico alemão Mestre Eckhart, das figuras de Marta e Maria no sermão de número 86 A Excelência de Marta sobre Maria. Apoiado neste sermão, faremos algumas análises filosóficas dos conceitos de vida contemplativa e vida ativa, pois compreendemos que ao realizar a interpretação da superioridade de Marta sobre Maria, Mestre Eckhart estabelece um novo paradigma interpretativo da vida contemplativa e ativa na filosofia medieval. Palavras-chaves: Mestre Eckhart. Mística. (...) Vida contemplativa. Vida ativa. Marta e Maria. (shrink)

This paper presents a formalism that combines useful properties of both logic and probabilities. Like logic, the formalism admits qualitative sentences and provides symbolic machinery for deriving deductively closed beliefs and, like probability, it permits us to express if-then rules with different levels of firmness and to retract beliefs in response to changing observations. Rules are interpreted as order-of-magnitude approximations of conditional probabilities which impose constraints over the rankings of worlds. Inferences are supported by a unique priority ordering on rules (...) which is syntactically derived from the knowledge base. This ordering accounts for rule interactions, respects specificity considerations and facilitates the construction of coherent states of beliefs. Practical algorithms are developed and analyzed for testing consistency, computing rule ordering, and answering queries. Imprecise observations are incorporated using qualitative versions of Jeffrey's rule and Bayesian updating, with the result that coherent belief revision is embodied naturally and tractably. Finally, causal rules are interpreted as imposing Markovian conditions that further constrain world rankings to reflect the modularity of causal organizations. These constraints are shown to facilitate reasoning about causal projections, explanations, actions and change. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objetivo contribuir com a crítica aos PNPG e suas determinações na produção do conhecimento dos professores de Educação Física das IES do estado da Bahia no período de 1982 a 2012, através da análise epistemológica. Trata-se de uma pesquisa documental, cujos dados foram analisado a luz do método do materialismo histórico e dialético. Os resultados apontam que os PNPG apresentam em seus objetivos e diretrizes uma concepção de pós-graduação que estimula o produtivismo acadêmico e a aproximação (...) da ciência ao capital que determinam uma produção predominantemente desenvolvida com base na lógica formal. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo hablaremos del desarrollo filosófico que Hegel hace de la ópera en su Estética. Para ello, haremos una breve explicación sobre las características de las dos versiones que hoy tenemos de esta obra hegeliana; esto tanto en su origen histórico como en las implicaciones teóricas de cada uno de estos textos. Posteriormente, localizaremos la ópera en cada una de las versiones de la Estética, para poder así exponer las particularidades y diferencias teóricas entre ambos materiales bibliográficos. Cabe (...) mencionar que profundizaremos en la ópera pensada como Gesamtkunstwerk, noción encontrada en la versión más reciente de los cursos de estética de Hegel, puesto que consideramos, además de su novedad, que es una noción del espíritu que nos conduce a nuevas precisiones en el estudio del pensamiento del filósofo de Stuttgart. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to expand the theoretical field of discursive injustice by identifying a specific kind of discursive injustice, namely, the kind we are subject to when we are unjustly prevented from exchanging reasons with others. Broadly speaking, discursive injustice is the kind of injustice we suffer when we are unjustly harmed as language users, most notably when we are prevented from using language in ways we are entitled to. The dominant approach to discursive injustice has focused (...) on the corruption of the illocutionary force of a speech act due to the hearer’s improper uptake. I claim that there is a genuinely distinct kind of discursive injustice, which I label as deliberative injustice, that cannot be accounted for by the dominant approach to discursive injustice. In my view, what makes deliberative injustice discursively unjust is that it amounts to denying someone a normative position that she is entitled to as a language user, which I understand in terms of being a source of reasons. Moreover, I explore two ways of trying to illuminate deliberative injustice by appealing to the social level of analysis, namely, by resorting to a structural explanation to explain how it comes about, and by asking what it signifies for the collective life of groups. In this regard, I show that the structural explanation has some explanatory limitations, and that deliberative injustice essentially constitutes a collective failure. (shrink)

The uncertainty concerning the genre of the Ḥorvat ʿUza ostracon 1 is problematized through the lens of linguistic anthropology. Although a denotative approach to the linguistic forms in this Hebrew ostracon is well attested, less attention has been paid to the indexical meaning of specific stylistic features and their semi- otic register implications. Several linguistic-ideological concepts are drawn upon to examine how the act of inscription and specialized linguistic forms align the discursive genre of the ostracon with prophecy. I seek (...) to determine what salient discourse forms in the ostracon index the employment of habitual utterance styles of prophecy that construct context, genre, and social identity. (shrink)

Interpreters are divided on the question of whether the phrase ‘form of life’ is used univocally in Wittgenstein’s later writings. Some univocal interpreters suggest that, for Wittgenstein, ‘form of life’ captures a uniquely biological notion: the biologically human form of life. Others suggest that it captures a cultural notion: the notion of differently enculturated forms of human life. Non-univocal interpreters, in contrast, argue that Wittgenstein does not use ‘form of life’ univocally, but that he uses it sometimes to highlight a (...) cluster of biological notions and sometimes a cluster of cultural ones. The debate between univocal and non-univocal readers has generated a raft of intricate, illuminating literature on both sides. If it remains to an extent open, it is partly as a result of the fact that the textual evidence available on this matter, in Wittgenstein’s later published and unpublished writings, is so limited. In this paper, I argue that considering Wittgenstein’s earlier treatment of ‘form’ can help to shed light on his later treatment of ‘form of life’. More specifically I argue that revisiting the Tractatus ’ treatment of ‘form’ gives us – perhaps surprisingly – reasons to support a non-univocal later reading of ‘forms of life’. (shrink)

Os sites institucionais das universidades são ferramentas importantes para que os estudantes acessem as informações referentes à instituição. Espera-se que as informações distribuídas nos sites sejam de fácil acesso e contemplem informações completas. Considera-se o cuidado com a saúde mental discente um assunto muito importante, mas pouco explorado e/ou investido. Esse estudo tem por objetivo problematizar e discutir sobre os serviços de saúde mental discente encontrados através das informações apresentadas nos sites institucionais das universidades e avaliar a facilidade de acesso (...) às informações. Foram escolhidas 11 universidades federais da região sul do Brasil por amostra de conveniência, sendo uma pesquisa qualitativa onde foi utilizado o método descritivo e interpretativo com o auxílio da etnografia virtual para construção dos dados. Ao longo da pesquisa, percebeu-se uma dificuldade em encontrar informações sobre suporte à saúde mental e informações completas sobre os serviços estudados. Durante o estudo houve o questionamento sobre a necessidade de pensar a saúde mental discente além do viés biomédico centralizado em dificuldades cognitivas e/ou possíveis adoecimentos no meio acadêmico. Existe uma urgência de criar propostas de prevenção e promoção à saúde mental universitária ampliando os campos de atuação do psicólogo escolar. (shrink)

Individual responsibility is usually articulated either in terms of an individual’s intentions or in terms of the consequences of her actions. However, many of the situations we encounter on a regular basis are structured in such a way as to render the attribution of individual responsibility unintelligible in intentional or consequential terms. Situations of this type require a different understanding of individual responsibility, which I call conditioned responsibility. The conditioned responsibility model advances that, in such situations, responsibility arises directly out (...) of the conditions in which the individual finds herself, irrespective of her intentions or of the consequences of her actions. This model gives rise to a series of challenges, some of which, I propose, can be addressed by drawing on Wittgenstein’s later notion of form of life, together with the notion of honesty implicit in his early approach to ethics. (shrink)

This book advances a reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that moves beyond the main interpretative options of the New Wittgenstein debate. It covers Wittgenstein’s approach to language and logic, as well as other areas unduly neglected in the literature, such as his treatment of metaphysics, the natural sciences and value. Tejedor re-contextualises Wittgenstein’s thinking in these areas, plotting its evolution in his diaries, correspondence and pre- Tractatus texts, and developing a fuller picture of its intellectual background. This broadening of the (...) angle of view is central to the interpretative strategy of her book: only by looking at the Tractatus in this richer light can we address the fundamental questions posed by the New Wittgenstein debate – questions concerning the method of the Tractatus , its approach to nonsense and the continuity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Wittgenstein’s early work remains insightful, thought-inspiring and relevant to contemporary philosophy of language and science, metaphysics and ethics. Tejedor’s ground-breaking work ultimately conveys a surprisingly positive message concerning the power for ethical transformation that philosophy can have, when it is understood as an activity aimed at increasing conceptual clarification and awareness. (shrink)

I defend a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion of religious attitude in the Tractatus , one that rejects three key views from the secondary literature: firstly, the view that, for Wittgenstein, the willing subject is a transcendental condition for the religious attitude; secondly, the view that the religious attitude is an emotive response to the world or something closely modelled on this notion of emotive response; and thirdly, the view that, although the religious and ethical pseudo-propositions of the Tractatus are (...) nonsensical, they nevertheless succeed in expressing the religious attitude endorsed by Wittgenstein. In connection to the first, I argue that the notion of willing subject as transcendental condition is abandoned by Wittgenstein in the Notebooks and is no longer a feature of his position in the Tractatus . In connection to the second, I argue that the religious attitude is dispositional rather than emotive for Wittgenstein: it is a disposition to use signs in a way that demonstrates one's conceptual clarity. Finally, in connection to the third, I argue that the religious or ethical attitude is strongly ineffable in that it cannot be described, expressed or conveyed by language at all. (shrink)

En la ética y la filosofía política contemporáneas es común apelar a alguna for-ma de consenso hipotético para justificar contenidos normativos. En el presente artículo llamo a esta posición “contractualismo” y defiendo tres tesis al respecto. Primera, es correcta la objeción común al contractualismo de que la estipulación de un consenso hipotético en una situación ideal de deliberación no añade nada a la justificación del contenido normativo en cuestión. Segunda, esta objeción da pie a lo que llamo “el dilema contractualista”: (...) cuando hay una situación de des-acuerdo entre dos agentes sobre si un contenido normativo x es correcto, apelar a un acuerdo hipotético en condiciones ideales de deliberación como medio para justificar x, equivale a caer en petición de principio o a establecer una trivialidad. Tercera, a la luz del “dilema contractualista”, el contractualismo no debe ser en-tendido como un método de justificación normativa. (shrink)

Resumen: El propósito de este trabajo es mostrar cómo la propuesta de la nueva retórica de Chaïm Perelman se constituye fundamentalmente en una teoría de la racionalidad práctica en perspectiva argumentativa. Para el desarrollo de esta tesis procedemos de la siguiente manera: primero se describe el giro pragmático que lleva a Perelman a señalar los límites de la lógica formal deductivista para el campo de los valores en algunos de sus textos de juventud; a continuación se muestra la apuesta de (...) Perelman por una nueva retórica como un tipo de aplicación de la racionalidad, desarrollada en su Tratado de la argumentación y algunos textos posteriores a 1958; y finalmente se desarrolla la noción perelmaniana de lo razonable en el marco de la argumentación jurídica, para mostrar cómo, desde esta perspectiva, Perelman se vincula al debate de la segunda mitad del siglo XX conocido como la “doctrina de los casos difíciles en derecho”.: The purpose of this work is to show how Chaïm Perelman’s new rhetoric proposal fundamentally constitutes a theory of practical rationality in an argumentative perspective. To develop this thesis, we proceed as follows: first, we describe the pragmatic turn that leads Perelman to point out the limits of formal deductivist logic in the field of values, in some of his youth texts; then, Perelman’s bet on new rhetoric is presented as a kind of application of rationality, developed in his Treaty of Argumentation and in some texts written after 1958; finally, the Perelmanian notion of reason is developed in the framework of legal argumentation, to show how, from this perspective, Perelman is linked to the debate of the second half of the twentieth century known as the “doctrine of difficult cases in law”. (shrink)

El trabajo vivo no es una categoría económica, sino que forma parte de la actividad práctica humana que surge del fundamento mismo de la vida. Sin embargo, en el sistema de producción capitalista el trabajo vivo es convertido en la determinación esencial del capital en su proceso de valorización. Así, mientras lo activo y lo subjetivo queda transformado en una objetividad muerta para los propios productores, el capital llega a su plena perfección con ello: el plusvalor. Partiendo de un análisis (...) ontológico de la actividad laboral encontramos que el trabajo vivo es la categoría simple sobre la que se articula el resto de categorías económicas. La perspectiva filosófica ha de permitirnos analizar, mostrar y especificar las íntimas relaciones que se establecen entre el capital y el trabajo, así como las metamorfosis y transformaciones que ha de sufrir el trabajo vivo para convertirse en entelequia del capital, es decir, el tránsito de lo vivo a lo muerto. (shrink)

The fictional beings are another story ourselves, and tell us another way to recover what we, wanting to be what we want; Stories in which they live, not knowing that his life is a story, a story that does not live as if it were, as if they lived their lives. The fictions of the world show us, not necessarily, as others do not, who am not! But who still am not, because I have not discovered completely all myself, and (...) sometimes I am without be them in this otherness for myself it is mine, but not mine yet, I am part of stories that are not my history, the world of text, stories where I am another, even myself, intratextual entity and not intraworld, reowned those others who just the text opens so imaginary and that the actual closure and silent, to the point where it is discovered that about me are the many stories that tell me I have the me or other me, where the mirror the other gives me an identity different readings, Be-who-I-am-and-who-else-to be-said-that-I, because I have built my own history identity, but the pair, others tell my story as the story of another, stories over and over that overlap but without being the same but the same, the stories of others that I am for others, who suspect without built my otherness, my other identities. (shrink)

In industrial societies workplace is the only battlefield where people can kill another without running the risk of facing the courts (Leynman, 1996). This picture of dehumanization work reveals that organizations stand as the scene of the permissibility and the justification of harassment at the workplace (mobbing), whichincreased gradually and adverse effects are alarming at the moment, without considering the quality of working life because so far few companies have woken to the fact that it can no longer continue explaining (...) the bankruptcy and instability of these causes as shrinking market, loss of investors, misguided government policies, strategies ineffective advertising and sale but the time has come to recognize that the conspiracies, sabotage, in a word, the struggle for power within each organization is a kind of silent and asymptomatic disease that eventually will kill to make their recovery process irreversible and even less hope of success, although some leaders unconscious be limited to talk about this as mere gossip, but envy is more professional than a potential threat is a lethal weapon that destroys companies from their foundations and from emerging as such. "Everyone against one!...¡ That is the question!". (shrink)

En las páginas que siguen trato de acercarme a estos dos grandes pensadores para ver qué es lo que tienen que decirnos acerca del hombre y de su historia. Marx confía en el progreso histórico y cree que finalmente los hombres pasarán del reino de la necesidad al de la libertad. Vico, en cambio, nunca creyó que el progreso fuese una necesidad que tenía que producirse inevitablemente, ni mucho menos que fuese irreversible, pues la barbarie está siempre acechando y toda (...) conquista es siempre precaria.I take this paper to be an approach to these two great thinkers in order to find out what they have to say about man and his history. Marx, unlike Vico, relies heavily in the historical progress and seems to be firmly convinced that men would eventually step into the kingdom of freedom once they have abandoned that of necessity. Vico, on the other hand, never believed that progress was bound inevitably to occur, let alone that it were an unavoidable process, since barbarism is always lying in wait and all conquer appears to be meager. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's earlier treatment of causation and induction remains thought‐provoking and relevant to contemporary debates in the philosophy of science. Wittgenstein's approach to causation and induction in the Tractatus emerges in the context of two separate, but related discussions. A negative discussion that aims to expose a particular understanding of natural necessity as nonsensical, and a more positive discussion concerning the role played by laws in the natural sciences. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein suggests that internal relations hold between propositions by virtue (...) of the latter's truth‐functional structures. Causal laws are instructions that circumscribe what counts as a senseful proposition of the causal form within an optional system. The natural necessity view (NNV) criticized by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus suggests that some relations of necessary entailment arise between possible states, not by virtue of any internal relations between them, but by virtue of the obtaining of certain laws of nature. (shrink)

Varios autores afines al proyecto del liberalismo político han propuesto diferentes modelos de razón pública para enfrentar la situación de desacuerdo moral permanente en las sociedades liberales. En este trabajo presentamos un modelo que defiende dos argumentos. Primero, argumentamos a favor de una interpretación deflacionista de las razones que son aceptables para los ciudadanos razonables. Segundo, introducimos una nueva terminología que distingue entre lo que llamamos razones dependientes, accesibles y aceptables. Sostenemos que sólo las segundas y las terceras son medios (...) adecuados de discusión dentro de la razón pública, y las terceras son un estándar correcto de justificación de política pública. (shrink)

En este trabajo respondo una objeción a la tesis de que la teoría de Rawls debe atender problemas relacionados a la injusticia histórica. Esta objeción sostiene que dicha teoría está justificada en no considerar problemas de injusticia histórica debido a su supuesto carácter exclusivamente prospectivo. La objeción tiene dos presentaciones diferentes. Primero, como la idea de que hay razones internas a la propia teoría de Rawls que justifican dicho carácter exclusivamente prospectivo —tales como el problema de elección modelado en la (...) posición original y el hecho de que la justicia-como-equidad debe ser una concepción de justicia no-comprehensiva. Segundo, como la idea de que hay razones externas a la teoría de Rawls —en concreto, la supuesta existencia del así llamado problema de la no-identidad, que justifican el carácter exclusivamente prospectivo no sólo de los principios de justicia rawlsianos sino de cualquier otra concepción de justicia distributiva. Trataré de mostrar que esta objeción, tanto en su presentación interna como externa, es equivocada. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the ethical responsibility of agents who find themselves in situations characterized by what I call the Individual Ethical Gap (IEG). Individual Ethical Gap situations are structured so as to rule out holding individuals responsible for their actions and omissions by virtue of the intentions behind or the consequences of their actions. I argue that, in IEG situations, individuals can nevertheless, depending on the circumstances, be held ethically responsible for their actions and omissions by virtue of (...) the conditions in which they find themselves operating. Individual Ethical Gap situations therefore give rise to what I call conditioned responsibility: responsibility stemming from the conditions in which one finds oneself enmeshed. This notion of an ethics stemming from conditions (rather than from consequences or intentions) gives rise to a particular form of vulnerability to error in our self- and other-ascriptions of ethical responsibility: a vulnerability in our ethical understanding. In the final section of the paper I use Pamela Sue Anderson’s discussion of vulnerability and of Kantian autonomy to show that this vulnerability arising from the conditioned aspect of our ethical responsibility need not be regarded as a threat to ethics but, on the contrary, as an element of belonging and of understanding that renders possible a more honest encounter with others and with the world. (shrink)